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NOTES
TO TELL THE TRUTH: AN ANALYSIS OF
FIDUCIARY DISCLOSURE DUTIES AND
EMPLOYEE STANDING TO ASSERT CLAIMS
UNDER ERISA
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 19741 ("ER-
ISA") was enacted to replace existing federal statutes governing
private deferred compensation schemes and retirement pro-
grams.2 Social and economic growth had diluted the effectiveness
of such acts as the Railroad Retirement Act,3 the Social Security
Act,4 and the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act.5 Congress
1 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 891 (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-461 (1988)
and in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
2 H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4642
(noting public dissatisfaction with early governmental programs like Railroad Retirement
Act, Social Security Act and Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act fueled private pen-
sion movement in United States).
3 Pub L. No. 93-445, 88 Stat. 1305 (1974) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 201-208).
The 1994 amendments were designed to completely restructure the Railroad Retirement
Act of 1937. The new benefits computation technique was designed to prevent "future ex-
cess costs to the Railroad Retirement System" and to "bring about more adequate coordina-
tion" between the Railroad Act and Social Security Act. S. Rp. No. 1163, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1975), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5702, 5702.
4 Pub L. No. 87-543, 76 Stat. 185 (1962) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 301)
(designed for the purpose of furnishing "financial assistance to aged and needy individu-
als"). Section 301 was later repealed, effective January 1, 1974, except with respect to Pu-
erto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1484 (1972) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 303(a)(b).
625
626 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:625
enacted ERISA with the dual purpose of protecting employees'
rights to pension benefits and alleviating undue burdens on the
pension and welfare system.6 Expanded protection of private pen-
sion plans and rapid accumulation of assets into the reserve bene-
fit structure7 were also intended to increase the number of em-
ployees participating in private retirement plans,8 and are
consistent with legislative intent to enhance workers' benefit pro-
tection.9 Unfortunately, such expanded benefit security threatens
to undermine Congress's subsidiary goal of containing pension
costs and avoiding undue burdens on the pension system.10
5 Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1934) (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. §§ 303-309).
Later repealed by Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 851 (1974) (codified in 29 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1)).
29 U.S.C. § 301 set forth Congressional findings and policy with respect to welfare and
pension plan disclosure. See Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832 (1974) (codified in 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001. Congress found that the growth in "size, scope and numbers" of employee benefit
and pension plans was "rapid and substantial." Id. As such, Congress endeavored to assure
the "equitable character" and "financial soundness" of these plans. Id. Congress also sought
to ensure proper disclosure standards and safeguards regarding the "establishment, opera-
tion and administration of such plans." Id. To be sure the "lack and employee information
and adequate safeguards concerning the operation of existing plans, Congress also im-
proved disclosure in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, and to provide for
the general welfare and the flow of commerce." Id.
6 H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4639
(noting ERISA was enacted to bolster existing legislation which failed to regulate ade-
quately private pension and welfare funds). The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 con-
ferred some control over private plans. Id. There were also three federal statutes which,
"although accomplishing different federal purposes and vested within different federal de-
partments for enforcement," regulated the administration of private pension plans prior to
ERISA's enactment. Id. at 4640-41. These statutes were the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, Pub. L. No. 591, 68A Stat. 134 (1954) (codified in 26 U.S.C. §§ 401-04; 501-03), the
Labor and Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified in
29 U.S.C. § 141) and the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 851 (1974) (codified in 29 U.S.C. § 301-309). Id. at 4641.
7 H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4641. In 1974, over 30 million employees were covered by private pension plans. Id. This
growth, combined with a "startling accumulation of wealth to back the benefit structure"
(in excess of $150 billion in 1974), provided the "basis for legislative efforts ... to assure
equitable and fair administration of all pension plans." Id. The House Report chronicles the
economic and social growth that preceded and fueled the private pension movement in the
United States. Id. at 4640. Americans embraced "an accelerated interest in private retire-
ment plans" in the years immediately preceding World War II that continued to gain mo-
mentum subsequently as the concept of retirement benefits was validated in the corridors
of judicial and governmental power. Id.
8 H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4640 (noting ERISA was designed to "promote a renewed expansion of private retirement
plans and increase the number of participants receiving private retirement benefits").
9 Id. at 4640. The dynamic surge in assets from increasingly urbanized society has sus-
tained expanding private pension systems in United States. Id.
10 See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 113 S. Ct. 2063, 2072 (1993) (discussing "tension be-
tween the primary [ERISA] goal of benefitting employees and subsidiary goal of containing
pension costs"); Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 n.17
(1985); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 515 (1981).
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The authors of the statute empowered ERISA participants and
beneficiaries with primary enforcement powers consistent with
Congress's fundamental purpose of protecting employees' rights to
pension benefits.1 1 To accomplish this objective, ERISA expressly
authorizes numerous causes of action. 12 Ensuing suits have
spawned an ongoing debate within the federal circuits regarding
the scope of ERISA's participant status language and fiduciary
disclosure duties.' 3 Such divergent judicial opinions concerning
the interpretation of employees' standing to bring suit and em-
ployers' fiduciary duties under ERISA exemplify the tension ex-
isting between the statute's facially conflicting policy goals of ben-
efitting employees and containing pension costs.14 As a result,
11 H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4642 (anticipating civil litigation by participants and beneficiaries under ERISA).
12 See Jody R. Nathan, ERISA Nuts and Bolts, 23 FALL-Brief 61, 61 (1993), available in
Westlaw, Labor and Employment library, at *1 (describing causes of action authorized
under ERISA); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(A) (1988) ("Claims can be brought against
plan administrators for failure to provide certain requested information."); 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988) (authorizing civil action by participants under ERISA "to recover
benefits due under the terms of the plan, to enforce rights under the terms of the plan, or to
clarify rights to future benefits under the plan").
13 See Fiduciary Responsibility: Labor Department Shifting Resources in Fiduciary Liti-
gation, 21 Pens. & Ben. Rep. (BNA) 480 (Feb. 28, 1994), available in WESTLAW, BNA-PEN
Library, at *5 (stating policy conflict has contributed to conflicting judicial opinions in fed-
eral circuits regarding employees' standing to bring ERISA actions and scope of employer's
fiduciary duties); see also C. Thomas Mason, III, ERISA Claims and Securities Arbitration,
in SEcuarrrEs ARBrrRATION 1994, at 105 (1994). The capacity of former employees and retir-
ees to bring actions is tricky area and although former employees who have received all of
their vested benefits are generally not granted standing to sue under ERISA, the courts
have stopped short of blanket standing exclusion. Id.; Edward E. Bintz, Fiduciary Respon-
sibility Under ERISA: Is There Ever a Fiduciary Duty to Disclose?, 54 U. Prrr. L. REV. 979,
990 (1993) (questioning "whether there is ever a fiduciary duty to disclose possible changes
to a plan that are under consideration but have not yet been adopted or implemented").
14 See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also Mertens, 113 S. Ct. at 2071 (exem-
plifying ERISA's conflicting policy foundations). In Mertens, a five-to-four decision, the
Supreme Court advocated a strict ERISA construction, consistent with Congress's subsidi-
ary objective of containing pension costs. Id. Although the Mertens court acknowledged
ERISA's expansion of fiduciary duties from common law trust principles, the Court exer-
cised a strict interpretation of the ERISA section permitting plan participants to bring civil
actions to obtain "appropriate equitable relief" to redress statute violations. Id. at 2067.
Specifically, the Court held that ERISA does not require nonfiduciaries "to avoid participa-
tion (knowing or unknowing) in a fiduciary's breach of fiduciary duty" and does not author-
ize suits for money damages against nonfiduciaries. Id. The dissent acknowledged the ma-
jority opinion's strict interpretation of "appropriate equitable relief" available to plan
participants under subsection (a)(3) of ERISA, but asserts an opinion more consistent with
legislative purpose of providing expanded protection to employees' pension benefit rights.
Id. at 2072. The dissent asserted that the statute "clearly does not bar" a cause of action by
plan participants "against nonfiduciaries who participate in a fiduciary's breach of duty
under the statute." Id. at 2074 n.1. The dissent noted that ERISA does not expressly pro-
hibit plan participants' remedies against nonfiduciaries "who actively assist in the fiduci-
ary's breach." Id. at 2074. Moreover, the dissent noted trust beneficiaries clearly had such a
remedy under the common law trust principles that form the statute's core and that ERISA
"was intended, above all, to protect the interests of beneficiaries." Id. at 2074.
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some circuits have adopted a strict statutory interpretation of ER-
ISA's "participant" language,15 while others have advocated a lib-
eral construction, which is arguably more consistent with Con-
gressional intent to protect workers' ERISA rights.
16
The Mertens decision "became the unlikely occasion for a serious attempt to rewrite some
of ERISA's enforcement provisions." Robert N. Eccles, Mertens Mania, 2 No. 3 ERISA Li-
TIG. REP. 1 (1993), available in WESTLAW, ERISALR Library, at *1. On October 6, 1994, a
bill was introduced before the 103d Congress, as drafted by the Department of Labor and
U.S. Senator Howard H. Metzenbaum (D-Ohio), which would have authorized a court "to
provide participants and beneficiaries the full economic value of any benefits they would
have received absent" violations of ERISA. Id. at *2. Most importantly for the purposes of
this Note, the bill would have reversed existing case law holding that a former employee
who has received benefits from a plan no longer has standing to sue under ERISA as a plan
participant or beneficiary. Id. Specifically, the bill would have amended 29 U.S.C. § 1132,
to read: "Any former participant or beneficiary.., shall be treated in the same manner as a
participant or beneficiary for purposes of standing to bring a civil claim under [ERISA]."
§ 2531, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 231 (D) (1994). Although the bill was defeated in the 102d
Congress, one observer of ERISA litigation predicted that "unhappiness about the trend of
the decisions" will lead to its resurrection. Eccles, supra, at *2. It is submitted that the
proposed bill would provide potential relief to those employees who relinquished their ER-
ISA participant status when they accepted all of their pension benefits upon retirement.
Specifically, the bill would offer an equitable solution to those retired employees who were
encouraged to accept early retirement based on their employers' misstatements that no
more lucrative plan amendments were being considered. Moreover, the proposed bill would
prevent employer-fiduciaries from cutting pension costs and depleting the participant pool
through their own malfeasance.
15 See Raymond v. Mobil Oil Corp., 983 F.2d 1528, 1529 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding em-
ployees who had received lump-sum payments of all their vested benefits were not "partici-
pants" in an ERISA plan and thus lacked standing to bring claim for fraudulent discharge).
Many other federal circuits have adopted a strict standard of ERISA standing. Stanton v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 792 F.2d 432, 434-35 (4th Cir. 1986) (concluding retired employee was not
"participant" in early retirement benefit plan and thus lacked standing to sue under ER-
ISA). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disregarded plaintiff's
assertion that he was a "participant" because he would have been eligible for additional
benefits "but for" his early retirement. Id.; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S.
101, 117 (1989) (reasoning only former employee who has "reasonable expectation of re-
turning to covered employment" or "colorable claim" to vested benefits may satisfy "may
become eligible" language of ERISA's participant definition); Yancy v. America Petrofina
Inc., 768 F.2d 707, 708 (5th Cir. 1985) (excluding retirees who have accepted all benefits to
which they are entitled from "participant" definition); Saladino v. I.L.G.W.U. Nat'l Retire-
ment Fund, 754 F.2d 473, 476 (2d Cir. 1985) (excluding all former employees who have
"neither a reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment nor a colorable claim
to vested benefits from 'participant' status"). The dispute in Firestone was founded on the
ERISA definition of plan participant. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7). "'Participant' means any em-
ployee or former employee of an employer ... who is or may become eligible to receive a
benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of such employer
... ." Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115; see also Kuntz v. Reese, 785 F.2d 1410, 1411 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 916 (1986) (holding former employees, who had received their pen-
sion plan benefits in lump sum, if successful, would receive only damage award; award
would have to constitute increase of vested benefits in order for retirees to be plan partici-
pants); Saladino, 754 F.2d at 476 (noting Congress did not intend to "burden plans with the
cost of reporting and disclosing to amorphous, undefined group of individuals" without sub-
stantial interest).
16 See Mullins v. Pfizer, 23 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 1994) (concluding retiree had standing
under ERISA since he would have been participant in early retirement plan "but for" his
former employer's alleged misrepresentations); Pace v. Signal Tech. Corp., 628 N.E.2d 20,
24 (Mass. 1994) (construing ERISA liberally to prevent employers from using "a statute
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The courts are equally inconsistent in regard to the scope of em-
ployers' duty to disclose pension plan amendments under consid-
eration, but not yet implemented.' 7 Some circuits have advocated
an expansive fiduciary disclosure obligation,' while others have
merely prohibited a plan fiduciary from affirmatively misleading
participants about employee benefit plan changes. 19
This Note will analyze the divergent circuit interpretations of
standing and employers' fiduciary duties under ERISA. Part One
presents a broad overview of ERISA's statutory framework, detail-
ing the right of employees and others to assert a claim for lost
benefits. Based on an analysis of both judicial interpretations,
this Note will conclude that a broad view of standing would better
protect the interests of employees and beneficiaries. Part Two will
focus on conflicting judicial interpretation of employers' fiduciary
duties under ERISA. This Note advocates both a more expansive
judicial interpretation of fiduciary disclosure duties and a more
liberal statutory reading of ERISA standing criterion.
I. EMPLOYEE STANDING To ASSERT CLAIMS FOR LOST BENEFITS
UNDER ERISA
Under ERISA, a plan participant may bring a civil action to re-
cover accrued benefits, to enforce rights or to clarify rights to fu-
ture benefits under a pension plan.20 A pre-condition to asserting
whose clear purpose [is] to benefit employees" as shield to conceal "any deceptive and
wrongful acts they may have committed against their employees").
17 See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also Porto v. Armco, Inc., 825 F.2d 1274,
1276 (8th Cir. 1987) (affirming district court's decision that "an administrator who complies
with the statutory standard for disclosure cannot be said to have breached [his] fiduciary
duty by not providing earlier disclosure"); Stanton v. Gulf Oil Corp., 792 F.2d at 435 (hold-
ing failure to furnish information regarding amendments to early retirement plan not vio-
lative of ERISA's disclosure provisions); Fine v. Semet, 699 F.2d 1091, 1094 (11th Cir.
1983); Fentron Industries v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 674 F.2d 1300, 1306 (9th
Cir. 1982).
18 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
19 See Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Plan adminis-
trator may not make affirmative material misrepresentations to plan participants about
changes to an employee pension benefits plan."); Drennan v. General Motors Corp., 977
F.2d 246, 250-52 (6th Cir. 1992) ("[Mlaterial misrepresentations concerning a prospective
or contingent ERISA plan would give rise to liability if the plan was under 'serious consid-
eration'."); Barnes v. Lacy, 927 F.2d 539, 543 (11th Cir. 1991) ("[Glenerally, employers owe
no fiduciary duty towards plan beneficiaries under ERISA" unless the employer 'acts as
both employer and plan administrator."); Berlin v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 858 F.2d
1154, 1163 (6th Cir. 1988) ("Misleading communications to plan participants regarding
[ERISA] plan administration... will support a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.").
20 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1988) (defining employees' rights to sue for benefits under
plan).
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such ERISA claims is to qualify within the meaning of the term
"participant" under ERISA.2' There is disagreement among the
federal circuits regarding the proper standing test to apply when
former employees are seeking to assert ERISA claims. 22 This dis-
cord reflects deep-rooted philosophical differences as to ERISA's
fundamental policy goals.2 3
A. Narrow Reading of ERISA's Employee Standing to Sue
Language: Firestone and its Progeny
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of em-
ployees' standing to assert an ERISA claim in Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Bruch.24 The Firestone Court held that only a for-
mer employee who may reasonably expect to return to "covered
employment" or who has a "colorable claim" to vested benefits may
bring an ERISA action under the statute's "participant" lan-
guage.' 5 Many courts have followed the standing test articulated
in Firestone.26 For example, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit in Raymond v. Mobil Oil Corp.,27 held that
retirees who had received a lump-sum payment of all the vested
benefits to which they were entitled under the company pension
plan were denied standing to sue under ERISA. Similarly, in
21 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988) (defining participant); see also Roger C. Siske et al., What's
New in Employee Benefits: A Summary of Current Case and Other Developments, in ALI-
ABA Course of Study, Pension, Profit Sharing, Welfare and Other Comp. Plans, Oct. 6-8,
1994, Vol. 1, at 1, 188-94. "Disputes often develop with respect to whether or not a particu-
lar individual qualifies as a 'participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary' within the meaning of
ERISA." Id.
22 See supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting dispute exists as to former employ-
ees' standing when they have received all vested retirement benefits).
23 See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying taxt; see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 2509.75-5,
2509.78-6 (1992) (providing informal fiduciary guidelines under ERISA); Bintz supra note
13, at 980. "ERISA imposes fiduciary standards on persons who have discretionary author-
ity with respect to the management of plan assets or the administration of a plan." Id.
24 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 103 (1989) (holding that "partici-
pant" is an individual who 'will prevail in a suit for benefits" or has eligibility to bring such
suit); see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
25 Firestone, 489 U.S. at 117; see also supra note 15 and accompanying text; H.R. REP.
No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4642. Vesting
refers to the:
[Nionforfeitable right of interest which an employee participant acquires in the pen-
sion fund. The benefit credits may vest in the employee immediately, although in most
cases participants do not become eligible for vesting of benefits until a stipulated age or
period of service, or a combination of both, is attained.
Id.
26 See Siske et al., supra note 21, at 188.
27 Raymond v. Mobil Oil Corp., 983 F.2d 1528, 1530 (10th Cir. 1993) (following Firestone
rationale).
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Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corp.,28 the Tenth Circuit denied a former
employee standing under ERISA to challenge a pension plan
amendment because he did not have a "colorable claim."29 The
court excluded former employees who had received all of their
vested benefits from ERISA's "participant" status coverage.3 0 Sim-
ilarly, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have adopted a strict reading
of ERISA's standing criteria, and have been reluctant to apply eq-
uitable relief principles to former employees' ERISA claims. 3 '
28 Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corp., 896 F.2d 463, 474 (10th Cir. 1990) (involving retiree who
received all of his vested pension benefits in single lump sum upon retirement and was
seeking "participant" standing to assert ERISA claim for lost benefits).
29 Id. at 473-74. The Mitchell court reasoned that a restrictive interpretation of ERISA
standing language was consistent with congressional policy to limit "the group of potential
claimants ... [in order to] avoid the creation of uncertainties about an employer's obliga-
tions under ERISA." Id.
30 Id. (quoting Joseph v. New Orleans Elec. Pension & Retirement Plan, 754 F.2d 628,
630 (5th Cir. 1985)). The court observed that:
[T]he definition of 'participant' under ERISA excludes ... former employees who have
received a lump-sum payment of all their vested benefits because 'these erstwhile par-
ticipants have already received the full extent of their benefits and are no longer eligi-
ble to receive future payments.
Id.; see also Jackson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 648 F.2d 225, 228 (5th Cir. 1981) ("May
become eligible" language of ERISA plan participant definition was intended to apply only
to current employees); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-3(d)(2)(ii) (1994) (denying participant status to
employees who receive lump-sum payments or "series of distributions" which represent bal-
ance of credit under plan).
31 Yancy v. American Petrofina, Inc., 768 F.2d 707, 708 (5th Cir. 1985). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Yancy lost his right to challenge a
subsequent change to the company's early retirement pension plan when he accepted with-
out dispute a lump sum retirement payment of "the full amount due to him under the
terms of the [company] plan" effective at his retirement. Id. Yancy alleged that the plan
fiduciaries' practice of changing the interest rate factors used to compute lump-sum distri-
butions was an immediate impetus to his early retirement and a breach of his employer's
fiduciary duty. Id. The Yancy court interpreted the ERISA definition of "participant" to
encompass only those employees who owned vested benefits. Id. A former employee who
"had received all benefits vested in him prior to his retirement" did not fall within this
limited interpretation of ERISA "participant." Id.; see also Kuntz v. Reese, 785 F.2d 1410,
1411 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 916 (1986). Former employees whose pension benefits
were fully distributed were denied standing to assert a claim since they were not "eligible
to receive a benefit.., at the time they filed suit." Id. The court reasoned that the former
employees were not participants since they had received all of their vested benefits in a
lump sum distribution. Id. Thus, the retirees in Kuntz, if successful, would only recover a
damage award which would constitute an increase in vested plan benefits. Id. The Court
followed previous circuit decisions that "former employees who have neither a reasonable
expectation of returning to covered employment nor a colorable claim to vested benefits
simply do not fit within the 'may become eligible' language of section 1002(7)." Id. (citing
Saladino v. I.L.G.W.U. Natl Retirement Fund, 754 F.2d 473, 476 (2d Cir. 1985). See gener-
ally Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 U.S. 134, 152-53 (1987) (refusing to say one
could only bring claim for benefits if he or she was entitled to benefits); Brach, 489 U.S.
101, 117 (1989) (holding such interpretation "departs from the statutory language because
to identity a 'participant' as any person who claims to be one begs the question of who is a
'participant' and renders [ERISA's 1002(7) 'participant'] definition superfluous").
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B. Expanding the Scope of ERISA's Participant Status
Language: The "But For" Standard and Equitable
Relief
Several circuits have refused to interpret ERISA standing re-
quirements so strictly. 2 Instead, they have granted standing
under ERISA to former employees even though they received all of
the vested benefits to which they were entitled upon retirement.
These courts have reasoned that former employees should be
given the opportunity to show that they would have been partici-
pants in the employer's newly amended retirement program "but
for" the fiduciary's affirmative material misrepresentations.3 4
For instance, in Vartanian v. Monsanto Co.,35 the plaintiff re-
ceived a lump-sum distribution of all the vested benefits to which
he was entitled under the company's benefit plan and retired
before the company announced a more generous retirement pro-
gram.3 6 The plaintiff alleged that he was unable to make an in-
formed early retirement decision due to the company's failure to
disclose truthfully their intentions to increase early retirement in-
centives in the near future. The United States Court of Appeals
32 See infra notes 33-70 and accompanying text.
33 See Early Retiree has ERISA Standing to Bring Misrepresentation Claim, 21 Pens. &
Ben. Rep. (BNA) 933 (May 9, 1994), available in WESTIAW, BNA-PEN Library, at *1. The
Second Circuit followed the First and Fifth Circuits' view that retirees, although techni-
cally not plan "participants," have standing to sue under ERISA. Id.; see also supra note 16
and accompanying text.
34 Mullins v. Pfizer, 23 F.3d 663, 667-68 (2d Cir. 1994) (granting retiree standing to
bring misrepresentation suit against former employer regarding early retirement plan
amendment announced shortly after retirement).
35 Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697, 700 (1st Cir. 1994) (granting early retiree
standing to sue former employer for breach of fiduciary duty where employer allegedly mis-
represented intentions to institute increased early retirement incentives).
36 Id. at 699. When Vartanian submitted a lump sum distribution request in accordance
with company policy, company officials assured him that no early retirement incentive pro-
grams were currently being contemplated. Id. at 698-99. Actually, the company had al-
ready given "serious consideration" to offering a more favorable early retirement plan to
facilitate future staff reductions. Id. at 699. Vartanian claimed that the company's misrep-
resentations caused him to retire before the more favorable plan was adopted. Id.
37 Id. at 698. Monsanto Co. had frequently instituted early retirement incentive pro-
grams in the past. Id. In February 1991, Vartanian heard rumors that "Monsanto was
going to offer a more favorable early retirement package as a retirement incentive in the
near future." Id. Vartanian had an anticipated early retirement date of May 1, 1991. Id. In
February or March 1991, and again in April, Vartanian's supervisors informed him that
the company had "no plans" to offer an early retirement incentive package. Id. Vartanian
expressed a willingness to postpone his early retirement date if such an incentive plan
were offered. Id. at 699. Vartanian retired on May 1, 1991, taking a lump-sum distribution
in accordance with the requirements of the 1986 plan. Id. Vartanian alleged that Monsanto
was in fact giving serious consideration to offering a special voluntary retirement program
in 1991 prior to the lump-sum benefit payment. Id. at 702.
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for the First Circuit granted the plaintiff standing to assert an
ERISA claim, despite his failure to satisfy the Firestone "colorable
claim" criterion.38
The court reasoned that the Firestone holding did not require a
denial of plaintiff's standing to assert his claims because the
Supreme Court's analysis in Firestone of ERISA "participant" sta-
tus was developed "without addressing the issue of standing."39
According to the Vartanian court, a denial of plaintiffs' standing to
assert ERISA claims would thoroughly frustrate Congress's inten-
tion both to encourage a liberal interpretation of the statute's re-
medial provisions among the federal courts4 ° and "to remove juris-
dictional and procedural obstacles to [ERISA] claims.
Moreover, such a holding would ignore many equitable and logi-
cal considerations. 42 Prior to his retirement, Vartanian was una-
ware of the company's material misrepresentations and, therefore,
could not have asserted a breach of fiduciary duty claim until after
he had retired and received his lump-sum distribution.4 3 Denying
the plaintiff standing under such circumstances would deprive
him of an adequate level of benefit protection and create an une-
38 See supra notes 30 & 31 and accompanying text (noting previous federal circuit hold-
ings denying former employees standing under similar factual circumstances); see also Bo-
ren v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., Inc., 933 F.2d 891, 893 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding
that since no contributions were made on his behalf, plaintiff was not entitled to vested
benefits and could not be plan "participant" for ERISA purposes); Berger v. Edgewater
Steel Co., 911 F.2d 911, 921 (3d Cir. 1990) ("In general, employees who retire and elect to
receive retirement benefits without any intention of returning to employment do not have
standing under ERISA to challenge subsequent changes to the retirement plan."); Tea-
gardener v. Republic-Franklin Inc. Pension Plan, 909 F.2d 947, 950-52 (6th Cir. 1990) (for-
mer employees lacked standing because they failed to satisfy Firestone standing test be-
stowing "participant" status only on those former employees with a "colorable claim" to
vested benefits).
39 Vartanian, 14 F.3d at 701 (refusing to interpret Firestone standing language as
"straightforward formula" applicable in all cases).
40 Id. at 702 (stating ERISA was designed to afford participants "broad remedies" for
redressing violations); S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. 3 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4871 (promoting full range of legal and equitable remedies available in
both state and federal courts and removal of jurisdictional and procedural obstacles which
in past appear to have hampered effective enforcement of fiduciary responsibilities).
41 Vartanian, 14 F.3d at 701-02 (quoting Hughes v. General Motors Corp., 852 F.2d 568
(6th Cir. 1988)) ("Doctrine of standing is concerned with whether a person is the proper
party to request adjudication of a particular issue.").
42 See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
43 Vartanian, 14 F.3d at 702. Although Vartanian was not "technically" a "participant"
in the pension plan at issue, the court held that the plaintiff should be given the opportu-
nity to show that "but for" his employer's wrongful conduct, he would have been a "partici-
pant" in the plan. Id.
634 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:625
qual bargaining relationship. 4 Such results would be inconsistent
with legislative goals of protecting employees and offering employ-
ees' interests on par with those of their employers. 45
Denying standing would also have the illogical and unfair impli-
cation of limiting employees' right to sue to only those situations
where employees become aware of their employers' breach prior to
their receipt of retirement benefits.46 Moreover, the denial of
standing in cases of employer misrepresentation would permit
employers to defeat employees' right to sue either by keeping their
breach a well-guarded secret until the employees receive their
benefits or by distributing a lump sum and terminating benefits
before employees can file suit.4 7
The Second Circuit has also adopted the "but for" analysis of
employee standing under ERISA. In Mullins v. Pfizer,8 plaintiff
opted for early retirement from Pfizer Inc. on April 1, 1990. 49 On
May 16, 1990, Pfizer announced a more favorable Voluntary Sev-
erance Option for which Mullins would have been eligible had he
not already retired. 5° The plaintiff alleged that Pfizer had made
deliberate material misrepresentations regarding the company's
intentions to institute more lucrative early retirement incen-
tives.51 Pfizer contended that Mullins had no standing to assert
44 H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4646
(noting ERISA was designed to fulfill "need of workers for level of protection which will
adequately protect their rights and just expectations").
45 Id.
46 Vartanian, 14 F.3d at 702 (quoting Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d 1209,
1221 (5th Cir. 1992)). "The employer should not be able, through its own malfeasance, to
defeat the employee's standing." Id.
47 Id. at 703 (acknowledging retired plaintiffs who had received all their vested benefits
lacked standing under ERISA); The Vartanian court also held:
[Wihere the employee shows that in the absence of the employer's breach of fiduciary
duty he would have been entitled to greater benefits than those to which he received,
then his receipt of payment cannot be used to deprive him of 'participant' status and
hence, standing to sue under ERISA.
Id. at 703; see also supra notes 15 & 38 and accompanying text (surveying federal circuits
that have adopted strict standard of ERISA standing).
48 Mullins v. Pfizer, 23 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding retiree-no longer techni-
cally benefit plan "participant" after his retirement-had standing under ERISA since he
would have been early retirement plan "participant" but for his former employer's alleged
misrepresentations).
49 Id. at 665. On April 1, 1990, Mullins signed an early retirement form and terminated
his employment with Pfizer. Id.
50 Id. The Voluntary Severance Option offered early retirement benefits in addition to
pre-existing Pfizer retirement benefits. Id.
51 Id. The District Court interpreted Mullins' complaint to allege "that Pfizer had con-
structively discharged Mullins by falsely denying that the VSO was under consideration
and thereby encouraging him to take early retirement before the VSO went into effect." Id.
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the ERISA claim because he retired before the new plan was of-
fered. 2 The Pfizer court followed the approach taken in the First
Circuit by permitting the plaintiff to show that "but for" Pfizer's
misrepresentation, he would have been a "participant" in the new
plan. 3 In this way, the Second Circuit prevented the fiduciary
from defeating the employee's standing through its own
impropriety. 4
Similarly, in Christopher v. Mobil Oil Co.," the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit validated the "but for" standard for de-
termining standing under ERISA.- 6 In Christopher, plaintiffs al-
leged that Mobil had constructively discharged hundreds of
employees by wrongfully inducing them into early retirement.5 7
Mobil contended that plaintiffs did not have standing because
they had failed to satisfy the Firestone test to be an ERISA "par-
ticipant".58 The Court rejected Mobil's claim, reasoning Firestone
52 Id. at 667.
53 Mullins v. Pfizer, 23 F.3d 663, 667 (2d Cir. 1994).
54 Id. at 668 (quoting Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d 1209, 1221 (5th Cir.
1992)).
55 950 F.2d 1209 (5th Cir. 1992).
56 Id. at 1221. "lit is] logical to say that but for the employer's conduct alleged to be in
violation of ERISA, the employee would be a current employee with a reasonable expecta-
tion of receiving benefits." Id.
57 Id. Until 1977, the standard method of receiving pension benefits at Mobil was in the
form of an annuity. Id. In 1977, Mobil instituted a lump sum pension benefit option. Id. "To
be eligible for the lump sum option, an employee had to have either an accrued lump sum
pension benefit, or a net worth independent of the pension, equal to at least $250,000." Id.
On July 2, 1984, Mobil announced changes to the lump sum option of the retirement plan,
including an increase in the eligibility threshold from $250,000 to $450,000. Id. These
changes would apply to all employees retiring after January 31, 1985. Id. A crucial choice
had been presented to employees who would have met the lower threshold but were uncer-
tain to meet the increased threshold for the lump sum option. Id. The lump sum pensions
were worth 40% more than the annuity, so those employees uncertain to reach the raised
eligibility plateau had a strong inducement to pursue early retirement during the six
month window period. Id. The crux of the dispute, however, centered on circumstances that
unfolded following the announcement of the amended plan. Id. Mobil had originally noti-
fied their employees that the changes were subject to Internal Revenue Service approval.
Id. In September 1984, the IRS "expressed concern that the amended plan could result in
benefits favoring highly compensated employees." Id. at 213. "In response, Mobil adopted
another plan amendment allowing Mobil, in its sole discretion, to waive the eligibility
threshold in individual cases for valid cause shown." Id. This amendment resulted in a
favorable IRS evaluation issued on November 23, 1984. Id. The problem was that while
Mobil announced the IRS approval to its employees on December 21, 1984 (before the six
month window period had expired), it "did not notify its employees of the waiver provision
until well after the expiration of the six month window [period]." Id. As a result, plaintiffs
who had submitted their retirement notices between August and October 1984 (and had
retired on January 1, 1985) filed an ERISA claim for wrongful constructive discharge. Id. at
1212-13.
58 Id. at 1220 (holding plaintiffs had "neither a colorable claim for vested benefits nor a
reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment").
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did not create a "straightforward [standing] formula" across the
full "spectrum" of all possible ERISA claims.59 The Mitchell court
recognized that a litigant other than a current employee or person
with a claim to benefits must be able to challenge an employer
action which deprives a former employee of benefits.60 Moreover,
the Court feared that such a strict application of Firestone would
allow the employer to deny the employee standing "through its
own malfeasance."61
The "but for" test is both logically reasonable62 and schemati-
cally consistent with ERISA's broad "zone of interests" protec-
tion.6 3 The zone of interests approach was recognized in Hughes v.
General Motors Corp. 64 The Hughes court based its standing in-
quiry on "whether a person has alleged such a personal stake in
the outcome of a justiciable controversy that he should be entitled
to obtain its judicial resolution."65 The plaintiffs in Hughes were
59 Id. at 1221. The Mitchell court saw decisions like Yancy and Berger as merely occupy-
ing the narrow end of the interpretive spectrum regarding ERISA standing and not disposi-
tive of the full range of potential interpretations of ERISA's "participant" language. Id.
60 Christopher, 950 F.2d at 1222. In sum, the Court reasoned that "the standing question
and the merits of an employee's claim are unavoidably intertwined to some degree; whether
a plaintiff has standing to assert ERISA rights may depend upon whether he can establish
a discharge or some other conduct in violation of ERISA, but for which he would have
standing." Id.
61 Id. at 1221. For example, in cases involving allegations of discharge, "it would be unu-
sual" to deny standing to a former employee solely because he lacked a claim for vested
benefits or a reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment. Id.; see also 29
U.S.C. § 1140 (1988) (making it unlawful for employer to "discharge, fine, suspend, expel,
discipline, or discriminate against a participant" for exercising right provided under
ERISA).
62 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (noting that employers would be able to
deceive employees without impunity in absence of "but for" standard).
63 Vartanian, 14 F.3d at 702. Vartanian was a "participant" at the time of the alleged
misrepresentations and the plan administrators had a duty not to affirmatively mislead
him regarding changes to the company's pension benefit system. Id.; see also Early Retire-
ment: Court Reinstates ERISA Charges of Deception For Not Disclosing Offer, 21 Pens. &
Ben. Rep. (BNA) 436 (Feb. 21, 1994), available in WESTLAW, BNA-PEN Library, at *2
(applying broader "zone of interests" test).
64 Hughes v. General Motors Corp., No. 87-1506, 1988 WL 72742, at *2-3 (6th Cir. July
14, 1988) (noting ERISA "manifests an intention that the right to bring claims concerning
pension benefits should be limited to those who are, or claim they are, entitled to receive a
benefit from a pension plan").
65 Id. at *3. Hughes was a retired employee of General Motors Oldsmobile division. Id. A
company pension program coordinator had assured Hughes that Oldsmobile was not con-
templating a program of increased early retirement benefits. Id. at *1. Relying on such
advice, both Hughes and a second plaintiff, Pettit, submitted written notices of their inten-
tions to retire on May 1, 1980. Id. In May 1980, Oldsmobile offered special early retirement
benefits to certain employees in an attempt to reduce its salaried workforce. Id. Both
Hughes and Pettit would have been eligible for the amended plan. Id. Plaintiffs claimed
that they were entitled to additional benefits due to Oldsmobile's misrepresentations about
its intent to offer a more favorable early retirement scheme. Id.
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receiving retirement benefits, but claimed that they were entitled
to additional benefits under a pension plan amendment instituted
after they had retired.66 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
exercised "traditional concepts of standing" in granting these re-
tirees standing.6 The Hughes court refused to condition a former
employee's standing to sue for additional benefits on his ability to
prove his entitlement to those additional benefits, since such logic
would turn the traditional concept of standing "on its head."68
ERISA zone of interests protection was also exercised in Astor v.
International Business Machines Corp.69 In Astor, plaintiffs were
granted standing to allege that their employer had coerced them
into participating in an early retirement program, even though
they had received all of the benefits to which they were entitled
under the plan.70 According to the Sixth Circuit, the plaintiffs'
concerns were within the "zone of interests" that ERISA was
designed to protect. 71
66 Id. at *2 (reasoning plaintiffs fit "precisely within the plain language [of ERISA]").
67 Id. at *3. The District Court had previously denied plaintiffs "participant" standing
"since the benefits sought were first made available as the result of an amendment adopted
after plaintiffs retired." Id. at *2. The District Court viewed plan effective upon plaintiffs'
retirement and amended plan offered after retirement as "separate and distinct 'employee
benefit plan[s]' for the purpose of determining who is a 'participant' having standing." Id.
The Court of Appeals rejected such rationale whose "practical effect ... was to require that
plaintiffs prevail on the merits-demonstrate that they are entitled to the additional bene-
fits-as a prerequisite to qualifying for the standing necessary to adjudicate the merits of
their claims." Id.; see also Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1970).
"The question of standing... concerns... whether the interest sought to be protected by
the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute" and where statutes are concerned, the trend is toward enlargement of the class of
people who may protest administrative action. Id.
68 Hughes, 1988 WL 72742, at *4. "Standing focuses on a person's effort to get his com-
plaint before a court and not on the issue he wishes to have adjudicated." Id. Although
plaintiffs were granted standing, their claims were not heard as the Court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction. Id. Plaintiffs claimed that they would have been entitled to additional
benefits under the terms of the plan "but for" defendants "maliciously, falsely [and] reck-
lessly" leading plaintiffs to believe that no plan amendments were forthcoming. Id. at *5.
The Court held that such claims "cannot fairly be said to be claims by a participant seeking
to recover benefits or enforce or clarify rights 'under the terms of the plan.'" Id. Neverthe-
less, the Court showed reluctance to deny plaintiffs a forum and expressed a desire to
amend such inequitable congressional legislation. Id.
69 Astor v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 7 F.3d 533, 538-39 (6th Cir. 1993).
70 Id. (rejecting employer's "strained interpretation" of ERISA employee standing
criterion).
71 Id. (granting plaintiffs standing since they had a sufficient "personal stake in the out-
come of a justiciable controversy"); cf Teagardner v. Republic-Franklin Inc. Pension Plan,
909 F.2d 947, 950-51 (6th Cir. 1990).
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II. EMPLOYERS FIDUCIARY DUTIES UNDER ERISA
Legislators intended ERISA both to protect the interests of em-
ployee benefit plan participants and alternately to avoid undue
hardships on the private pension plan system. 7 2 These competing
policies are evident in its statutory language which features both
traditional trust principles to protect workers' interests73 and
strict reporting and disclosure rules7 4 to shelter fiduciaries' in-
vestments and monitor pension plan financing. 75 In short, ER-
ISA's strict fiduciary disclosure language76 is at odds with ER-
ISA's design to foster employee benefit protection. 77 As a result,
circuit courts disagree on the scope of a fiduciary's ERISA duty to
disclose to plan participants potential plan changes under consid-
eration, but not yet implemented.78
A. Legislative History and Common Law Origins of Fiduciary
Duties under ERISA
ERISA establishes fiduciary standards for employers who exer-
cise discretionary authority over pension plan asset management
and plan administration. 79 Employers often engage in discretion-
ary policy decisions such as creating, amending or terminating a
72 Bintz, supra note 13, at 990 (detailing relevant case law regarding whether plan fidu-
ciaries are obligated to disclose changes in employee pension plans that are "under consid-
eration," other than pursuant to ERISA's express disclosure rules).
73 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988) (establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obli-
gation for fiduciaries in order to protect interests of participants in employee benefit plans);
see also Drennan v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 250 (6th Cir. 1992) (discussing
Congress's intent in enacting ERISA and fiduciary duties under ERISA).
74 See Bintz, supra note 13, at 981-82. An ERISA "plan administrator is required to pro-
vide a summary plan description to each participant within... 120 days of the plan becom-
ing subject to ERISA's reporting and disclosure rules." Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102.2
(1974) (outlining contents of summary plan description).
75 120 CONG. REc. 29,928, 29,953 (1974) (statement of Sen. Nelson). "Congress [is]
acutely aware that under our voluntary pension system the cost of financing pension plans
is an important factor in determining whether a pension plan will be adopted." Id.
76 120 CONG. REc. 29,928, 29,945 (1974) (statement of Sen. Long). "[W]e know that new
pension plans will not be adopted and that existing pension plans will not be expanded...
if the costs are made overly burdensome, particularly for employers." Id.
77 H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4642
(indicating ERISA is attempt to balance interests of employers in maintaining flexibility in
design and operation of their pension programs, and rights and expectations of employees
in benefits protection); see 120 CONG. REc. 29,192, 29,198 (1974) (statement of Rep. Ull-
man) (noting disclosure requirements have been carefully designed to provide adequate
protection for employees and, at same time, provide favorable setting for growth and devel-
opment of private pension plans).
78 See infra note 82 and accompanying text (describing federal circuits' varied interpre-
tations of fiduciary disclosure duties under ERISA).
79 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (1974). An employer is a fiduciary regarding a company pension
plan to the extent that:
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pension plan as well as administrative decisions regarding an ex-
isting plan. 0 Courts have been tolerant of employers' dual roles in
designing and administering employee benefit plans, 8 1 only im-
posing ERISA fiduciary obligations on employers acting in their
(i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting manage-
ment.., or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other
compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other property of such
plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary
authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.
Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 533, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4646. ERISA framers had "particular interest" in regulating "the conduct of administration
and operations of pension plans." Id. Specifically, ERISA was enacted to foil the "grossly
unfair" practice of holding "an employee accountable for [conditions] which disqualify him
from benefits,... [even] if these conditions were stated in a misleading.., manner." Id.; see
also Ethan Lipsig et al., Settlor Function Litigation Under ERISA, C719 A.L.I.-A.B.A. EM-
PLOYEE BENEFSrrs LrIG. 295, 303 (1992) (noting "settlor" functions include "decisions relat-
ing to the establishment, termination and design of plans [as opposed to the management
of plan assets] and are not fiduciary activities subject to Title I of ERISA"); Barnes v. Lacy,
927 F.2d 539, 543-44 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding ERISA fiduciary duties apply to employer
acting as plan administrator); Payonk v. BMW Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 221, 225 (3d Cir.
1989). "Employers who act as plan administrators assume fiduciary status only when and
to the extent that they function in their capacity as plan administrators, not when they
conduct business that is not regulated by ERISA." Id.; Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 861
F.2d 897, 912 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989). "When an employer de-
cides to establish, amend, or terminate a benefits plan, as opposed to managing any assets
of the plan and administering the plan in accordance with its terms, its actions are not to
be judged by fiduciary standards." Id.; United Indep. Flight Officers v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 756 F.2d 1262, 1268 (7th Cir. 1985). "[Tlhe administrator of a plan is a fiduciary only
to the extent he is engaged in administration." Id.; Gulf Resources & Chem. Corp. v.
Gavine, 763 F.Supp. 1073, 1081-82 (D. Idaho 1991). "Every decision that an employer
makes which has some effect on the employee benefit plan, is not necessarily a decision
which is controlled by ERISA's fiduciary standards." Id.
80 Drennan v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1993) (illustrating diffi-
culties encountered by courts in distinguishing between employer's "two hats," i.e. roles as
plan administrator and officeholder).
81 See Lipsig et al., supra note 79, at 295, 297. "[U]nder ERISA, an employer may wear
'two hats,' one as the 'settlor' in designing an employee benefit plan and the other as a
'fiduciary' in administering the plan. Id. An employer is not a fiduciary when it is acting in
the settlor capacity." Id.; Frank Cummings, ERISA Litigation: An Overview of Major
Claims and Defenses, ALI-ABA EMPLOYMENT & LAB. REL. L. CoRP. CouNs. & GEN. PRAC.,
Mar. 5, 1994, at 563, 581. "Participants often challenge the actions of plan fiduciaries who
wear 'two hats,' regardless of whether such actions were taken in the ... plan administra-
tion context." Id.; William L. Scogland, Fiduciary Duty: What Does it Mean, 1989 A.B.A.
SEc. TORT & INS. PaAc. 24, 806. "[Fliduciaries may wear two hats.... courts have been
tolerant of this dual role, distinguishing when a fiduciary is acting in his role as fiduciary of
the plan as opposed to when he is serving as a businessman and making decisions for the
business." Id.; see also Drennan v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1993)
("[Misleading communications to plan participants 'regarding plan administration' will
support a claim for breach of fiduciary duty."); United Mine Workers of America v. Powatan
Fuel, 828 F.2d 710, 713 (lth Cir. 1987) (holding president "assumes fiduciary duty 'only
when and to the extent' that they function in their capacity as health plan fiduciaries, not
when they conduct business that is not regulated by ERISA"); Amato v. Western Union
Intl, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1416-17 (2d Cir. 1985). "[A] simplistic formulation of the distinc-
tion is that a person is not acting as a fiduciary when he makes business decisions that
affect employee plans, but is a fiduciary when he acts with respect to a plan in an attempt
to effect business ends." Id.
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discretionary capacity as plan administrators.8 2 ERISA's statu-
tory language, however, does not expressly enumerate an em-
ployer's fiduciary obligations.8 3 Rather, ERISA's fiduciary stan-
dards are founded upon common law trust principles.84 Thus,
employers acting as fiduciaries are required to communicate facts
material to the beneficiaries' interests if the employer knows the
information is unavailable to the beneficiary and would be neces-
sary to protect the beneficiary.8 5
ERISA imposes three general obligations on employers acting
as fiduciaries to plan participants; such duties are consistent with
common law trust principles.86 First, employers must comply with
ERISA's "prudent person rule,"8 7 which requires a fiduciary to dis-
82 See Berlin v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1163 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting ER-
ISA does not interfere with employer acting solely as businessman in interest of business
as opposed to acting in capacity as fiduciary of company pension plan); see also Amato, 773
F.2d at 1416-17 (employers do not have fiduciary status under ERISA when conducting
regular business activities).
The courts have identified discretionary policy decisions not subject to ERISA fiduciary
obligation. Compare Powatan Fuel, 828 F.2d at 713-14 (stating president paying business
expenses of company in time of potential company collapse is not acting as trustee under
ERISA, but rather is acting in company's interests), West v. Greyhound Corp., 813 F.2d
951, 955-56 (9th Cir. 1987) (no breach of duty found when employer threatened to termi-
nate employees who did not accept reduction in unaccrued benefits), Cunha v. Ward Foods,
Inc., 804 F.2d 1418, 1432 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding employer who terminated pension plan
acted in corporate capacity and not as administrator), [and] Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co.,
740 F.2d 454, 456 (6th Cir. 1984) (stating employers have no affirmative fiduciary duty
under ERISA to provide employees with pension plan at all), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1109
(1985); with Berlin, 858 F.2d at 1163-64 (indicating any misrepresentations made to plan
participants after serious consideration of potential plan changes could constitute breach of
fiduciary duty); Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. Retirement Plan v. Penn Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 698 F.2d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 1983) (Stating that lying is inconsistent with duty of loyalty
owed by all fiduciaries); [and] Rosen v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Union
of Phila., 637 F.2d 592, 600 n.11 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding fiduciaries are under duty to com-
municate material facts to plan beneficiaries).
83 See Bintz, supra note 13, at 984. "ERISA does not expressly enumerate the duties of a
fiduciary, but rather relies on the common law of trusts to define the general scope of a
fiduciary's responsibilities." Id.; Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension
Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a)
(1988) ("Assets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust."); S. REP. No. 127, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4865. "[T]he fiduciary re-
sponsibility section, in essence, codifies and makes applicable to these fiduciaries certain
principles developed in the evolution of the laws of trusts." Id.
84 Porto v. Armco, Inc., 825 F.2d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating ERISA common law
trust principles prohibit use of pension plan assets for benefit of anything other than plan
itself); see supra note 81 and accompanying text.
85 Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co. of America, 919 F.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating
duties of ERISA fiduciaries are not limited by statute's express provisions but instead in-
clude common law trust duty to disclose material information); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS 173 (1959).
86 Berlin, 858 F.2d at 1162 (explaining fiduciary standards imposed under ERISA); Don-
ovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263,271 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1069 (1982); see also 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (discussing fiduciary duties).
87 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1988); see also infra note 85 and accompanying text.
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charge his pension plan duties with the "care, skill, prudence and
diligence" that a "prudent person" would use under similar cir-
cumstances.8 Second, employers engaged in fiduciary activities
must exercise a duty of loyalty to participants and beneficiaries, 9
by acting "solely in the interests of the plan's participants and
beneficiaries." 9° Third, ERISA requires a fiduciary to act "for the
exclusive purpose" of providing benefits to plan beneficiaries.9 1
Statutory framers, by incorporating such common law origins into
the statute itself, acknowledged that fiduciaries' duties may sur-
pass ERISA's explicit disclosure language. 92 According to some
commentators, such interpretation is consistent with the legisla-
tive goal of protecting employees' rights. 93
88 29 U.S.C. § 1104(aX1XB) (1988); see also Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 457 (10th Cir.
1978). "The explicit language of... section 1104(a)(1)(B) indicates that the prudent person
test applies to fiduciary obligations under ERISA." Id.
89 Berlin v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1162 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting Morse v.
Stanley, 732 F.2d 1139, 1145 (2d Cir. 1984)). "The prudent man standard, combined with
the duty of loyalty imposes an unwavering duty on an ERISA trustee to make decisions
with single-minded devotion to a plan's participants and beneficiaries and, in so doing, to
act as a prudent person would act in a similar situation." Id.
90 Berlin, 858 F.2d at 1162 (citing Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473
U.S. 134, 158 (1985)) ("[U]ltimate consideration [toward achieving ERISA's underlying
purpose concerns] enforcement of strict fiduciary standards of care in the administration of
all aspects of pension plans and promotion of the best interests of participants and benefi-
ciaries"); Donovan, 680 F.2d at 271 (noting all decisions regarding ERISA plans "must be
made with an eye single to the interests of the participants and beneficiaries").
91 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1988) (requiring fiduciaries to discharge their duties for exclu-
sive purpose of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries and defraying rea-
sonable expenses of administering plan).
92 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (1988) (stating fiduciary must discharge its duties "with the
care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent
[person] acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use"); see Eddy v.
Colonial Life Ins. Co. of Am., 919 F.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("The duties of an ERISA
fiduciary are not limited by that statute's express provisions."); 120 CONG. REC. 29,933
(1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits) (stating intent for "a body of Federal substantive law [to be]
developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private
welfare and pension plans"); Bintz, supra note 13, at 984 (stating Supreme Court has advo-
cated "federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans"). "Leg-
islative history of ERISA contains no evidence of an intent to limit the scope of the federal
common law rights and obligations that would be developed under ERISA." Id. at 988.
Although ERISA does not define specifically whether scope of fiduciary's duty to disclose
information to participants and beneficiaries extends beyond statute's express reporting
and disclosure rules, questionable logic would support the notion that a fiduciary's disclo-
sure duties to plan participants is limited to the statute's express language. Id.
93 Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 457 (10th Cir. 1978) (case law and legislative history of
ERISA demonstrate prudent person test is identical to standard developed in common law
of trusts); Morrissey v. Curran, 567 F.2d 546, 548-49 (2d Cir. 1977); S. REP. No. 127, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974), reprinted in 1974, U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4864-66; see also supra
notes 74 & 82 and accompanying text.
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B. Judicial Interpretation of ERISA Fiduciary Disclosure
Duties
The United States Supreme Court has not defined the scope of
an employer's fiduciary duty to disclose under ERISA.9 4 Conse-
quently, the law remains unsettled regarding whether fiduciaries
have a disclosure duty beyond ERISA's specific reporting and dis-
closure rules.95
Some courts have refused to recognize a fiduciary disclosure
duty beyond ERISA's specific reporting and disclosure rules.9 6 For
example, in Porto v. Armco, Inc. , the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit concluded that administrators do not have to pro-
vide disclosure earlier than required by ERISA's statutory disclo-
sure standards in order to meet their fiduciary duty.98 Commenta-
tors have noted that the Porto court failed to reconcile ERISA's
broad fiduciary duty language with the statute's strict reporting
94 See Trenton v. Scott Paper Co., 832 F.2d 806, 809 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
1022 (1988) (denying certiorari to hear issue); Amato v. Western Union Intl, Inc., 773 F.2d
1402, 1416-17 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 474 U.S. 1113 (1986); Moore v. Reynolds Met-
als Co., 740 F.2d 454, 456 (6th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1109 (1985).
95 Bintz, supra note 13, at 990 (describing unsettled state of case law in this area). Com-
pare Sutter v. BASF Corp., 964 F.2d 556, 562 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that company is not
acting as fiduciary agent when deciding to amend or terminate welfare benefits plan);
Barnes v, Lacy, 927 F.2d 541, 544 (11th Cir. 1991) (company did not breach duty by failing
to notify employee of amendment provisions in plan); Payonk v. HMW Industries, Inc., 883
F.2d 221, 229 (3d Cir. 1989) (employer's lawful termination decision absent misrepresenta-
tion designed to mislead employees is not covered by ERISA); United Mineworkers of Am.
v. Powatan Fuel, 828 F.2d 710, 710 (11th Cir. 1987) (business decision not involving ER-
ISA); [and] Porto v. Armco, 825 F.2d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir. 1987) (ERISA plan administrator
complied with statutory standards and therefore could not be held liable for not providing
earlier disclosure) with Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 994 F.2d 130, 134-35 (3d Cir.
1993) (failure to disclose considerable efforts being undertaken to implement retirement
benefits program constituted breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA); Drennan v. General
Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 252 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating General Motors had fiduciary duty
to keep class informed so participants could make appropriate decision); Eddy, 919 F.2d at
750 (fiduciary had duty to inform plaintiff of all options when group policy was cancelled);
Berlin v. Michigan Bell Tel., 858 F.2d 1154, 1163-64 (6th Cir. 1988) (asserting that fiduci-
ary duty to avoid misrepresentations arose once company gave serious consideration to
plan); Peoria Union Stock Yards Co. Retirement Plan v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 698
F.2d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 1983) (lying is inconsistent with duty of loyalty owed under ERISA)
[and] Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982) (decisions must be made
according to interests of corporation).
96 See supra note 95 and accompanying text (comparing circuits' divergent interpreta-
tions regarding scope of ERISA's fiduciary duty requirements).
97 825 F.2d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir. 1987)
98 Porto, 825 F.2d at 1276. Upon his retirement, Porto made an irrevocable decision to
defer certain distributions from the company pension plan. Id. Subsequently, the company
adopted a plan allowing "once irrevocable decisions on withdrawal choices upon retirement
to be revocable." Id. The plan administrator notified local employed plan participants of the
amendment, but did not inform local retired participants such as Porto. Id.
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and disclosure rules.99 Instead, the court reasoned that a fiduci-
ary's duty is discharged once ERISA's express disclosure require-
ments have been met.'0 0 The Porto court's narrow holding is con-
trary to other circuit decisions which have expanded a fiduciary's
disclosure duties beyond ERISA's express terms under certain
conditions.10'
For instance, in Berlin v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.,102 plain-
tiffs alleged that they had been misled intentionally into retire-
ment based on the company's assertions that the latest early re-
tirement incentive package had been a "one-time offer."' 03 The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that while fiduciaries
must avoid making material misrepresentations to plan partici-
pants, fiduciaries are not affirmatively obligated to communicate
with potential plan participants about future pension plan incen-
tives.104 Under such a narrow rationale, a fiduciary would not be
penalized for declining to comment about the possibility of future
plan changes. 10 5 Such an inequitable result contradicts ERISA's
99 Id. at 1276 ("The fiduciary duty imposed by ERISA is generally applied to manage-
ment of plan assets."); see Bintz, supra note 13, at 1018. "ERISA's fiduciary duty rules
clearly extend to the administration of a plan as well as the management and investment of
plan assets." Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (1988).
100 Porto, 825 F.2d at 1276. "As a matter of law, a breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim cannot
be based on a failure to disclose when the statutory disclosure requirements have been
met." Id.; see also Kytle v. Stewart Title Co., 788 F. Supp. 321, 324 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (stating
fiduciary fulfilled its obligations to plan participants by merely complying with ERISA's
express reporting and disclosure requirements).
101 See supra note 23 and accompanying text; see also Palinov v. Casey, 664 F.2d 854,
858-59 (1st Cir. 1981). The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recognized
that specific circumstances may obligate a fiduciary to disclose plan amendments prior to
the date required by ERISA's express reporting and disclosure provisions. Id. The court
reasoned that a trustee's actions in regard to communicating plan changes to participants
is governed by a "fundamental fairness" criterion. Id. A fiduciary has neglected such "fair-
ness" obligation when, for example, "pension eligibility rules are changed without giving
notice to those who, with minimal effort, might easily have avoided the loss of [their] pen-
sion rights." Id. at 859; Agro v. Joint Plumbing Ind. Bd., 623 F.2d 207, 211 (2d Cir. 1980);
Valle v. Joint Plumbing Ind. Bd., 623 F.2d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 1980).
102 See Berlin, 858 F.2d at 1164 (stating employers' "material misrepresentations" may
constitute breach if future plan amendments have received serious consideration); see also
infra note 118 and accompanying text.
103 Berlin, 858 F.2d at 1160 (emphasizing difficulty inherent in determining when em-
ployer's conduct became sufficiently "serious" consideration regarding future plan
changes).
104 Id. at 1164. Company had made available special early retirement incentives to em-
ployees retiring between October 1, 1980 and December 1, 1980. Id. at 1156-57. Subse-
quently, company announced a second early retirement window period of enhanced incen-
tives for employees retiring between June 1, 1982 and July 31, 1982. Id. Plaintiffs were
employees who had retired between these two window periods on the strength of company's
alleged assertions that no new plan was being considered. Id.
105 Id. at 1164; see also Bintz, supra note 13, at 997 (advocating that no affirmative duty
to disclose prospective plan changes should be imposed).
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basic common law trust foundations and is inconsistent with
ERISA's objective of protecting employees' rights to pension
benefits. 10 6
In contrast, other circuits have required fiduciaries not only to
disclose information expressly required by ERISA, but also to
avoid affirmatively misleading participants regarding potential
plan amendments, including those under consideration but not
yet implemented. 10 7 For instance, in Fischer v. Philadelphia Elec-
tric Co.,' the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit prohibited
plan administrators from making affirmative material misrepre-
sentations to plan participants about employee pension plan
changes. ' 0 9 The plan fiduciary had failed to inform inquiring em-
ployees about an early retirement plan under consideration." 0
The Court found the company's furtive efforts to conceal violative
of ERISA's fiduciary spirit"' and imposed a heavy disclosure duty
106 See Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 158 (1985) "Courts
must always bear in mind.., the underlying purposes of ERISA-enforcement of strict
fiduciary standards of care in the administration of all aspects of pension plans and promo-
tion of the best interests of participants and beneficiaries." Id.
107 See supra note 95 and accompanying text (noting disparate judicial opinion regarding
scope of fiduciary disclosure obligations).
108 Fischer, 994 F.2d 130, 133 (3rd Cir. 1993) (stating company was both employer and
plan administrator and therefore had fiduciary duty to discharge its duties "solely in the
interests of the participants and the beneficiaries").
109 Id. at 135. Evidence indicated Philadelphia Electric Co. ("PEC") had been seriously
contemplating, as early as October, 1989, adopting an early retirement plan to reduce
costs. Id. at 131-32. PEC's practice gave informational retirement interviews to prospective
retirees some months before they wished to retire. Id. at 132. Prospective retirees,
prompted by circulating rumors about early retirement program, approached company in-
terviewers about six months before early retirement plan in question was announced. Id.
Although PEC was in fact contemplating such a plan, it instructed retirement interview
counselors to merely inform interviewees "exactly what the plan called for at the time." Id.
The plan that was finally announced on April 19, 1990 provided favorable options to em-
ployees who elected to retire between July 15 and September 15, 1990. Id. Plaintiffs were
former PEC employees who retired between January 1 and April 1, 1990 and therefore did
not qualify for benefits under new early retirement plan. Id. Plaintiffs claimed that PEC
had a fiduciary obligation under ERISA to tell the truth about the contemplated plan when
asked by plan participants. Id. at 133.
110 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. PEC could not avoid its fiduciary obliga-
tions by claiming that retirement interview counselors were simply uninformed and there-
fore were telling the truth as far as they knew. Fischer, 994 F.2d at 135. The Court held
such fiduciary obligations could not be "circumvented by building a 'Chinese wall' around
those employees on whom plan participants reasonably rely for important information and
guidance about retirement. Id. Simply put, when a plan administrator speaks, it must
speak truthfully. Id.
111 Fischer, 994 F.2d at 135. The court stated that:
[A] misrepresentation is material if there is a substantial likelihood that it would mis-
lead a reasonable employee in making an adequately informed decision about if and
when to retire. Included within the overall materiality inquiry will be an inquiry into
the seriousness with which a particular change to an employee pension plan is being
considered at the time the misrepresentation was made. All else equal, the more seri-
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on the plan administrators.1 12 In so holding, the court conformed
ERISA's narrow reporting and disclosure rules to its broad trust
law duties of loyalty and prudence. 1 13
Similarly, in Drennan v. General Motors Corp.," 4 the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit embraced a broad interpretation of
ERISA fiduciary duties.1 5 The plan administrator in Drennan
had consistently informed plaintiffs that a new retirement plan
would not be made available to them, 1 6 despite the fact that the
company seriously considered otherwise. 117 As in Fischer, the
Drennan court imposed an affirmative duty on plan fiduciaries to
disclose to affected employees information about future plan
amendments under serious consideration. 1 18 The court limited
ously a plan change is being considered, the more likely a misrepresentation, e.g., that
no change is under consideration, will pass the threshold of materiality.
Id.
112 Id. at 133 (refusing to condone company's "conspiracy of silence.., aimed at keeping
confidential the considerable efforts being taken to implement an early retirement incen-
tive program").
113 Id. at 133 (quoting Berlin, 858 F.2d at 1158). "A fiduciary may not materially mislead
those to whom the duties of loyalty and prudence are owed." Id.
114 977 F.2d 246, 248-49 (6th Cir. 1993). Class of former General Motors (GM) employees
decided to accept lump sum payments under company sponsored unemployment plan
("SUP"). Id. at 248. In exchange, these former employees relinquished certain employment
and seniority rights. Id. at 249. GM introduced a more generous Voluntary Termination of
Employment Program (VTEP) following employees' departure and excluded them from new
plan because company "no longer considered [them] to be GM employees, having relin-
quished and forfeited all of their employee rights as a result of accepting the SUP buyout."
Id. Employees sued GM claiming that it breached its fiduciary duty by not disclosing that
it had been seriously considering implementing more generous VTEP options. Id. at 248.
115 Id. at 252 (noting "GM was impressed with a fiduciary duty to keep [employees]
abreast of its consideration to permit their participation" in new retirement program).
116 Id. at 249 (noting GM had been instructing management "to convey negative impres-
sions to the [plaintiffs] indicating that VTEP would not be available for their participation
and that the program was 'dead in the water' as far as laid off employees were concerned").
117 Id. at 251. "The district court's finding that GM had a VTEP-type plan for laidoff...
employees under 'serious consideration' while it was conducting various management-
Class meetings... is well supported by the record." Id.
118 Id.
[Tihe duty to avoid material misrepresentations does not require the employer to pre-
dict an ultimate decision to offer a plan so long as it fairly discloses the progress of its
serious considerations to make a plan available to affected employees.
Id.; Compare Berlin, 858 F.2d at 1164 (stating if the "plan fiduciary does communicate with
potential plan participants after serious consideration has been given concerning a future
[plan] offering ... then any material misrepresentations may constitute a breach of their
fiduciary duties.") with Stanton v. Gulf Oil Corp., 792 F.2d 432, 435 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding
"it is not a violation of ERISA to fail to furnish information regarding amendments before
these amendments are put into effect"), Barnes v. Lacy, 927 F.2d 541, 541-42 (11th Cir.
1991) (holding company had complied with ERISA's disclosure rules and therefore fulfilled
its fiduciary responsibilities since summary plan description specifically stated that em-
ployer retained right to amend plan) and Sutter v. BASF Corp., 964 F.2d 556, 561, 563 (6th
Cir. 1992) (holding employer abided by strict standards since its decision occurred prior to
enactment of ERISA).
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this duty, however, by permitting non-disclosure of the substan-
tive aspects of the bargaining process. 119
In addition, in Eddy v. Colonial Life Insurance Co.,12° the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that a fiduciary's duty
is "not discharged" by simply satisfying ERISA's express reporting
and disclosure rules.' 2 ' Rather, the court imposed an obligation on
the plan fiduciary not only to avoid misleading participants, but
also to fulfill the affirmative duty to disclose to participants "com-
plete and correct material information" about plan options. 122
These circuit decisions are consistent with ERISA's objective to
protect the interests of participants and its broad fiduciary lan-
guage which originated in the common law of trusts.123 Nonethe-
less, statutory language, while providing broad fiduciary conduct
guidelines, does not specify the extent to which a fiduciary must
disclose information to participants and beneficiaries.' 24 Although
ERISA's express reporting and disclosure rules impose minimal
requirements on plan administrators, 125 the statute does not ad-
dress whether a fiduciary is obligated to disclose possible changes
to a plan under consideration but not yet adopted or imple-
119 See Drennan, 977 F.2d 246, 251 (citing Payonk v. HMW Industries, Inc., 883 F.2d
221, 226 (3d Cir. 1989)) (noting while fiduciary must give inquiring employees "complete
and accurate information," such duty does not require disclosure of "substantive aspects of
the bargaining process").
120 919 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Eddy asked insurer, Colonial Life, prior to expiration
of company group health policy, "about [his] conversion rights underneath [the] policy." Id.
at 749. A Colonial Life supervisor "said that [Eddy] did not have the right to convert [his
employment-based coverage] to an individual policy." Id. As a result, Eddy did not "con-
vert" his coverage and his health coverage terminated on September 14, 1987. Id. Eddy
sued Colonial Life for allegedly misinforming him about his conversion rights, thereby
breaching its fiduciary duties under ERISA. Id. at 748; see supra note 95 and accompanying
text.
121 Eddy, 919 F.2d at 750. The court held that fiduciaries' duties are "not limited by
[ERISA's] express rules but instead include duties derived from common law trust princi-
ples." Id. The court reasoned that broad obligations of common law trust principles "carries
through in all of the fiduciary's dealings with beneficiaries." Id. The court also held that
"Colonial Life was required to do more than simply not misinform, Colonial Life also had
an affirmative obligation to inform-to provide complete and correct material information
on Eddy's status and options." Id. at 757.
122 Id. at 752 (explaining affirmative duty of disclosure is "well-rooted in the common
law of trusts").
123 See Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 489, 121 N.E. 378, 379,
154 N.Y.S. 1123, 1123 (1918) (Judge Benjamin Cardozo espousing fiduciaries' trustee obli-
gations); see also infra note 130 and accompanying text.
124 See Bintz, supra note 13, at 988. The express language of ERISA provides little indi-
cation as to whether there is ever a fiduciary duty to disclose information to participants
and beneficiaries. Id. Neither ERISA's fiduciary duty nor reporting and disclosure rules
directly address the relationship between the two sets of rules. Id.; see also supra notes 72,
74, 76-78 and accompanying text.125 See supra notes 74 & 76 and accompanying text.
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mented. 126 The aforementioned circuit court decisions which ad-
vocate such an affirmative fiduciary disclosure duty are consistent
with legislative intent to promote plan beneficiaries' interests
without placing undue burdens on the pension and welfare benefit
system. 127 Statutory framers designed ERISA to afford workers
greater benefits protection than had existed previously under
common law.1 28 Utilizing ERISA's expanded trust principles to
extend its limited disclosure rules and to create a fiduciary obliga-
tion to disclose plan changes under consideration would be consis-
tent with legislative intent to expand benefit protection. 129
As adopted by some federal circuits, the affirmative fiduciary
duty to disclose information to participants about potential plan
changes is admittedly problematic for pension plan administra-
tors.13 0 Such a duty may preclude businesses' ability to encourage
employees to retire under a current early retirement incentive
package.' 31 It is submitted, however, that employees' interests in
receiving all of the information available about future plan
amendments under serious consideration outweigh the employers'
interest in effectuating business objectives that cannot be realized
without deception.
Moreover, a policy requiring greater disclosure will not subvert
either of the competing goals of ERISA, namely to protect employ-
ees' rights and to avoid undue burdens on the pension and welfare
126 Bintz, supra note 13, at 990.
127 See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (describing underlying trust principles
constituting ERISA's foundation).
128 Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1983) ("courts have... recog-
nized that in enacting ERISA Congress made more exacting the requirements of the com-
mon law of trusts relating to employee benefit trust funds"); see also Sinai Hosp. of Balti-
more, Inc. v. National Benefit Fund for Hosp. & Health Care Employees, 697 F.2d 562, 565
(4th Cir. 1982) (noting requirements of common law trusts relating to employee benefit
trust funds have been made more exacting by congressional action); Marshall v. Glass/
Metals Assoc. & Glaziers & Glassworkers Pension Plan, 507 F. Supp. 378, 383 (D. Haw.
1980) ("[Section 1104] establish[es] uniform federal requirements to be interpreted both in
the light of the common law of trusts, as well as with a view toward the special nature,
purpose, and importance of modern employee benefit plans"); H.R. RFP. No. 1280, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 302 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5083; Hutchinson & On-
drasik, Fiduciary Responsibility under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act,
HANDBOOK Of EmpLOYEE BENEFITS 737, 742-54 (1984); Joan Vogel, Until Death Do Us Part:
Vesting of Retiree Insurance, 9 INDus. REL. L.J. 183, 223 (1987). "[W]hen a party is a fiduci-
ary, ERISA imposes stringent standards for fair dealing, standards that are more stringent
than what existed under prior state trust law." Id.
129 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
130 Bintz, supra note 13, at 997 (asserting fiduciary duty to disclose potential plan
changes not yet implemented must be "strictly limited"). Id.
131 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
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system.132 Rather, Congress's goal of expanding workers' benefit
protection may be accomplished by extending ERISA's fiduciary
duty provisions to require plan administrators to disclose to in-
quiring plan participants information about potential plan
changes under serious consideration. 3 3 Such an expansive duty
would conform with ERISA's underlying trust law foundations
and would protect workers from being "betrayed by silence." 134
III. CONCLUSION
Federal courts have divided greatly over the issue of standing
under ERISA. While some circuits have narrowly construed the
term "participant," others have more accurately allowed a broader
construction. Under the "but for" test, the circuits have given a
prospective plaintiff the opportunity to show that "but for" mate-
rial misrepresentations on the part of the plan provider, he or she
would have been a participant in the plan. Such a broad interpre-
tation of ERISA standing is consistent with the intent of Congress
to protect beneficiaries' interests and would offer a remedy to re-
tirees who relied on information provided by plan administrators.
Moreover, the equitable value of such an interpretation would out-
weigh any resulting economic burden on the pension and welfare
system.
In addition to allowing standing to a broader class of ERISA
participants, the federal courts should uniformly impose ERISA's
common law trust principles upon plan administrators and re-
quire administrators to affirmatively disclose potential changes in
their benefit plans. The federal courts should not confine fiducia-
ries' obligations to ERISA's express disclosure and reporting du-
ties. The view espoused by some circuits, essentially requiring
nothing more than a "no comment" from plan administrators,
132 See supra notes 72, 74, 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing balance between
ERISA's purpose of protecting employee rights and not placing undue burdens on pension
and welfare system).
133 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (discussing fiduciary duty outlined by
Congress).
134 Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 489, 121 N.E. 378, 379, 154
N.Y.S. 1123, 1123 (1918). Judge Cardozo interpreted fiduciaries' trustee duties as follows:
A beneficiary... may be betrayed by silence as well as by the spoken word. The trustee
is free to stand aloof, while others act, if all is equitable and fair. He cannot rid himself
of the duty to warn and to denounce, if there is improvidence or oppression, either
apparent on the surface or lurking beneath the surface, but visible to his practiced eye.
Id.
1995] TO TELL THE TRUTH 649
leaves no recourse for those improperly induced by a plan admin-
istrator. An informed judgment cannot be made without full dis-
closure of the underlying facts governing a benefit plan. Only a
broad fiduciary duty standard will sufficiently fulfill Congress's in-
tent to protect workers' rights without imposing undue burdens on
the system or allowing employers to benefit from their own
malfeasance.
Steven Davi

